Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc. by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-17-2013 
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset 
Securitization Transactions, Inc. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc." (2013). 
2013 Decisions. 146. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/146 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-3454 
______ 
 
PENSION TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS; 
Individually and on behalf of itself  
and all others similarly situated, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MORTGAGE ASSET SECURITIZATION 
TRANSACTIONS, INC.; DAVID MARTIN;  
PER DYRVIK; HUGH CORCORAN; 
PETER SLAGOWITZ; UBS REAL ESTATE 
SECURITIES, INC.; 
UBS SECURITIES, LLC; UBS AMERICAS INC. 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-10-cv-00898) 
District Judge:  Honorable Claire C. Cecchi 
______ 
 
Argued June 25, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER 
and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 2 
 
(Filed: September 17, 2013) 
 
Douglas S. Wilens, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd 
120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500 
Boca Raton, FL  33432 
Counsel for Appellant Pension Trust Fund for 
Operating Engineers 
 
Peter S. Pearlman, Esq. 
Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman, Herrmann & Knopf 
Park 80 West – Plaza 1 
250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401 
Saddle Brook, NJ  07663 
Counsel for Appellant Pension Trust Fund for 
Operating Engineers 
 
Rukhsanah Singh, Esq. 
Liza M. Walsh, Esq. 
Connell Foley 
85 Livingston Avenue 
Roseland, NJ  07068 
 Counsel for Appellees Mortgage Asset 
 Securitization Transactions, 
 Inc., David Martin, Per Dyrvik, 
 Hugh Corcoran, UBS Real 
 Estate Securities, Inc., 
 UBS Securities, LLC, Peter Slagowitz, 
 and UBS Americas Inc. 
 
 3 
Lawrence J. Zweifach, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Gibson Dunn 
200 Park Avenue, 47th Floor 
New York, NY  10166 
 Counsel for Appellees Mortgage Asset 
 Securitization Transactions, 
 Inc., David Martin, Per Dyrvik, 
 Hugh Corcoran, UBS Real 
 Estate Securities, Inc., 
 UBS Securities, LLC, Peter Slagowitz, 
 and UBS Americas Inc. 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Lead Plaintiff Pension Trust Fund for Operating 
Engineers (the “Operating Engineers”) appeal from the 
District Court’s initial order dismissing without prejudice 
their amended class action complaint (the “Amended 
Complaint”), which alleged violations of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., by subsidiaries and employees 
of UBS AG (“UBS”), for failure to plead compliance with the 
one-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 13 of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.  The Operating Engineers 
also appeal from the District Court’s subsequent order 
dismissing with prejudice their second amended class action 
complaint (the “Second Amended Complaint”) as untimely 
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under an inquiry notice standard.  Although we hold that a 
Securities Act plaintiff need not plead compliance with 
Section 13 and that Section 13 establishes a discovery 
standard for evaluating the timeliness of Securities Act 
claims, we nonetheless conclude that the class action claims 
in the original complaint (the “Original Complaint”) were 
untimely.  Therefore, we will affirm. 
I. 
A.
1
 
This appeal involves mortgage-backed securities, 
investment vehicles that were among the casualties of the 
financial crisis of the late 2000s.  In a traditional mortgage, a 
lending institution, known as the originator, extends credit to 
a borrower.  In exchange, the borrower promises to repay 
principal and interest on the loan, and the borrower’s real 
property serves as collateral in case of her default.  The 
originator follows guidelines, known as underwriting 
standards, to ensure that it receives a return on its investment.  
                                              
1
 The factual background is drawn from the Second 
Amended Complaint and public records.  See Lum v. Bank of 
Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting, in 
deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), that a court may consult “the allegations 
in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters 
of public record, and documents that form the basis of a 
claim” (citations omitted)).  The Operating Engineers do not 
contest our consideration of this external evidence. 
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For example, to evaluate the borrower’s creditworthiness, the 
originator assesses the ratio of her monthly mortgage-related 
obligations to her monthly gross income (the “debt-to-income 
ratio”).  And to assess the collateral’s worth, the originator 
evaluates the ratio of the outstanding mortgage obligation to 
the property’s appraised value (the “loan-to-value ratio”). 
For mortgage-backed securities, the originator sells the 
loan to a financial institution to realize immediate profit and 
to reduce future risk of default.  The financial institution 
pools the loan with others, deposits the loans into a trust, and 
sells certificates issued by the trust to investors.  Investors are 
entitled to receive cash flows from the principal and interest 
payments made by the borrowers on the loan pool in the trust.  
The rate of return on the securities partially depends on the 
riskiness of the underlying loans, which, in turn, is partially 
measured by the debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios. 
The mortgage-backed securities in this case, known as 
the MASTR Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-3 (the 
“Certificates”), were offered to the public on May 14, 2007.  
UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc. (“UBS Real Estate”), the 
sponsor of the Certificates, purchased the underlying loans 
from originators, including Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
(“Countrywide”) and IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (“IndyMac”).  
UBS Real Estate then sold the loans to Mortgage Asset 
Securitization Transactions, Inc. (“MASTR”), the depositor 
of the Certificates.  MASTR next placed the loans into the 
MASTR Adjustable Rate Mortgages Trust 2007-3 (the 
“MASTR Trust”), the issuer of the Certificates.  UBS 
Securities, LLC (“UBS Securities”), the underwriter of the 
Certificates, finally sold the Certificates to investors like the 
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Operating Engineers, who purchased Series 12A1 Certificates 
with a face value of $5,123,977 on September 18, 2007.
2
 
The Certificates were issued pursuant to a Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Form S-3 Registration 
Statement filed on December 16, 2005, as amended by an 
SEC Form S-3/A supplemental pre-effective Registration 
Statement on April 4, 2006 (together, the “Registration 
Statement”), and an SEC Form 424B5 Prospectus 
Supplement filed on May 14, 2007 (the “Prospectus 
Supplement” and, together with the Registration Statement, 
the “Offering Documents”).  The Registration Statement was 
signed by MASTR’s officers and directors, including David 
Martin, Per Dyrvik, Hugh Corcoran, and Peter Slagowitz. 
The Offering Documents stated that Countrywide 
originated about 52% and IndyMac originated about 40% of 
the mortgages backing the Certificates.  The Offering 
Documents assured investors that the underlying loans were 
originated pursuant to particular underwriting policies, 
practices, and procedures and in compliance with federal and 
state laws and regulations.  For example, the Offering 
Documents indicated that the availability of the loans was 
limited to those borrowers whose creditworthiness, as 
revealed by the debt-to-income ratio, was within accepted 
limits.  Additionally, the Offering Documents provided that 
                                              
2
 The MASTR Trust is owned and controlled by 
MASTR.  MASTR, UBS Real Estate, and UBS Securities are 
subsidiaries of UBS Americas Inc. (“UBS Americas”), which 
is, in turn, a subsidiary of UBS. 
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the real property that was collateral for the loans was 
appraised pursuant to the generally-accepted Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and that certain 
quantities of the loans were within specific ranges of loan-to-
value ratios.  Finally, the Offering Documents represented 
that no material legal proceedings were pending against “the 
sponsor, the depositor or the issuing entity” of the 
Certificates.  App. at 1728.  Based on these guarantees, 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and Standard & 
Poor’s (“S&P’s” and, together with Moody’s, the “Ratings 
Agencies”) rated the Series 12A1 Certificates as AAA, the 
highest quality investment grade, in September 2007. 
However, because Countrywide and IndyMac 
“systematically ignored” and “completely” and “wholly 
disregarded” proper underwriting standards, UBS’s 
statements in the Offering Documents about the loans 
underlying the Certificates were materially false and 
misleading.  Id. at 382 ¶ 9, 384 ¶ 14, 411 ¶ 86.  In particular, 
the debt-to-income ratios were inaccurate because they were 
based on inflated income figures, and the loan-to-value ratios 
were skewed because they were based on inflated property 
appraisals.  As a result of UBS’s untrue statements and 
omissions about the underwriting standards, the Certificates 
were substantially more risky than disclosed in the Offering 
Documents. 
From late 2007 through early 2009, many news articles 
linked the high delinquency rates of mortgages originated by 
Countrywide and IndyMac to the abandonment of accepted 
underwriting standards.  For example, on April 30, 2008, the 
Wall Street Journal reported on the “mounting evidence of 
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serious problems with [Countrywide’s] underwriting of many 
home loans,” which included allegations that the company 
“deliberately overlooked inflated income figures for many 
borrowers,” and relaxed its lending standards regarding the 
estimated values of the real estate.  Id. at 1949.  Also in 2008, 
the non-profit Center for Responsible Lending released a pair 
of reports criticizing Countrywide’s and IndyMac’s 
underwriting standards.  See, e.g., id. at 1960 (describing how 
Countrywide’s “appraiser was being ‘strongly encouraged’ to 
inflate property values on homes,” and “employees were 
coaching borrowers to falsify their incomes on their 
applications”).  Throughout this time, numerous class action 
securities suits were filed against Countrywide and IndyMac 
related to their lax underwriting standards. 
On February 20, 2009, citing inappropriate 
underwriting standards, Moody’s reduced the rating of the 
Series 12A1 Certificates to B2, a speculative grade.  
Similarly, on August 13, 2009, S&P’s reduced the rating of 
the Series 12A1 Certificates to B.  By February 2010, because 
of the deficient underwriting standards, about 61% of the 
underlying loans were in delinquency, default, or foreclosure, 
and the value of the Certificates on the secondary market had 
decreased by 40% to 50%.  As a result, the monthly 
distributions that the Operating Engineers received from the 
MASTR Trust for their Certificates were significantly 
reduced.  And if the Operating Engineers had sold their 
Certificates on the secondary market, then they would have 
suffered a substantial loss. 
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B. 
On February 22, 2010, one year after Moody’s 
downgraded the rating of the Certificates,
3
 an investor filed 
the Original Complaint asserting claims under Sections 11, 
12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 
77l(a)(2), and 77o, against MASTR, UBS Real Estate, UBS 
Securities, Martin, Dyrvik, Corcoran, Moody’s, and S&P’s 
parent company in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  “On March 29, 2010, in the course of 
the usual monitoring of its investment portfolio,” the 
Operating Engineers “learned of significant losses to the 
value of the Certificates” and “the existence of potential 
claims.”  App. at 464 ¶ 193.  Pursuant to the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), the Operating Engineers 
petitioned to be appointed as Lead Plaintiff, and the District 
Court granted their request on October 18, 2010. 
The Operating Engineers then retained a consultant to 
research potential claims, “result[ing] in the substantive 
allegations set forth” in the Amended Complaint, which was 
filed on December 13, 2010.  App. at 464 ¶ 194.  The 
Amended Complaint dropped the claims against Moody’s and 
S&P’s, but added claims against UBS Americas, the MASTR 
Trust, and Slagowitz.  UBS moved to dismiss the Amended 
                                              
3
 Because February 20, 2010 fell on a Saturday, one 
year from the date Moody’s downgraded the rating of the 
Certificates includes Monday, February 22, 2010 for statute-
of-limitations purposes.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 
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Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing that the Operating Engineers had failed to plead 
compliance with Section 13 of the Securities Act.  The 
District Court agreed with UBS and dismissed the Amended 
Complaint without prejudice for the Operating Engineers to 
re-plead compliance with the statute of limitations. 
The Operating Engineers finally filed the Second 
Amended Complaint, which dropped the claims against the 
MASTR Trust and added ten paragraphs alleging compliance 
with the statute of limitations.  See App. at 461 ¶ 187 - 465 ¶ 
196.  UBS moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint 
on the basis that the Securities Act claims were untimely.  
The District Court, applying an inquiry notice standard, 
determined that the claims were untimely under Section 13 
and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with 
prejudice.  The Operating Engineers timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal under 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
dismissal of a claim as untimely under a statute of limitations, 
In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 543 F.3d 
150, 160 (3d Cir. 2008), and for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6), Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc).  We must accept all well-pleaded factual 
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allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, but “we are not compelled to 
accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, 
or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Id. 
(quotation omitted).  Pursuant to these principles, we may 
only dismiss claims that “lack facial plausibility.”  Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
III. 
 Both the Amended Complaint and the Second 
Amended Complaint asserted claims under Sections 11, 
12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act.  Section 11 “concerns 
material misstatements or omissions in registration 
statements;” Section 12(a)(2) “concerns material 
misrepresentations in prospectuses and other solicitation 
materials;” and Section 15 “provides for joint and several 
liability on the part of one who controls a violator of Section 
11 or Section 12.”  In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
438 F.3d 256, 269, 284 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  All 
three provisions are governed by the same statute of 
limitations, DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 
209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007), which is set forth in Section 13 of 
the Securities Act, and which requires actions to be brought 
“within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or 
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence,” 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
 On appeal, the Operating Engineers raise two claims of 
error.  First, the Operating Engineers assert that the District 
Court erred in dismissing the Amended Complaint because 
they should not have been required to plead compliance with 
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the statute of limitations.  Second, the Operating Engineers 
contend that the District Court erred in dismissing the Second 
Amended Complaint because the timeliness of Securities Act 
claims under Section 13 should be evaluated under a 
discovery standard, not an inquiry notice standard, and 
because the class action claims in the Original Complaint 
would be timely under such a standard.
4
  We address these 
arguments below. 
A. 
 The Operating Engineers first argue that the District 
Court erred in requiring them to plead compliance with the 
statute of limitations.  UBS responds that this issue is outside 
the scope of this appeal, and that, regardless, the Operating 
Engineers are incorrect on the merits.  We conclude that this 
issue is within the scope of this appeal, and we hold that a 
Securities Act plaintiff is not required to plead compliance 
with Section 13. 
 UBS contests our jurisdiction to consider this question 
because the Operating Engineers’ notice of appeal “clearly” 
references “only” the District Court’s order dismissing the 
Second Amended Complaint.  Response Br. at 55.  While the 
                                              
4
 The Operating Engineers expressly disclaim any 
argument that the District Court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.  
See Reply Br. at 25 (“[T]he Operating Engineers d[o] not 
argue on appeal that the district court should have permitted 
another opportunity to file an amended complaint.”). 
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Operating Engineers’ notice of appeal does identify “the 
Opinion and Order . . . dismissing with prejudice the Second 
Amended . . . Complaint,” it also expressly “encompasses . . . 
all prior rulings made by the district court.”  App. at 28.  
Thus, we disagree with UBS’s characterization of the 
Operating Engineers’ notice of appeal. 
 UBS is correct that “[w]hen an appeal is taken from a 
specified judgment . . . , the court of appeals acquires thereby 
no jurisdiction to review other judgments . . . not so 
specified.”  Response Br. at 56 (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. 
v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  
Nonetheless, we “liberally construe[] notices of appeal,” 
Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation 
omitted), and exercise jurisdiction over “other judgments” 
that are “fairly to be inferred from the notice,” Elfman 
Motors, 567 F.2d at 1254 (citations omitted).  Thus, under the 
merger rule, the designated final judgment “draws in question 
all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the 
judgment,” id. at 1253 (citation omitted), where “(1) there is a 
connection between the specified and unspecified orders; 
(2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; 
and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full 
opportunity to brief the issues,” Wiest, 710 F.3d at 127 
(quotation omitted). 
 Here:  (1) the specified order dismissing the Second 
Amended Complaint and unspecified order dismissing the 
Amended Complaint concerned Section 13 of the Securities 
Act; (2) the Operating Engineers’ intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent from the text of their notice of 
appeal; and (3) UBS has not alleged any prejudice and has 
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fully briefed the issue.  Therefore, we have jurisdiction over 
this issue.  See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 
704-06 (3d Cir. 1996) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over 
two unspecified prior interlocutory orders dismissing some 
claims where notice of appeal only specified later final order 
dismissing other claims). 
 On the merits, the Operating Engineers challenge the 
District Court’s ruling that they were required to plead with 
particularity compliance with Section 13 of the Securities 
Act.  The District Court relied on a line of precedent in the 
District of New Jersey which requires securities plaintiffs to 
plead with particularity compliance with the applicable 
statutes of limitations, Kress v. Hall-Houston Oil Co., No. 92-
cv-543, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6350, at *5-6 (D.N.J. May 12, 
1993), by setting forth “the time and circumstances of the 
discovery of the fraudulent statement, the reason why 
discovery was not made earlier, and the diligent efforts 
plaintiff undertook in making such discovery,” Urbach v. 
Sayles, 779 F. Supp. 351, 364 (D.N.J. 1991) (citations 
omitted).  This rule is purportedly necessary because a 
securities statute of limitations “sets forth . . . a substantive 
requirement rather than a procedural one.”  In re The 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 
584, 598 (D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 The propriety of this rule is an issue of first impression 
for us.  It is true that we have recognized that “when a statute 
creating a new cause of action contains in itself a statute of 
limitations, the limitation imposed becomes an integral part of 
the right of action created by the statute.”  Pa. Co. for Ins. on 
Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 985 (3d 
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Cir. 1941).  Applying this principle, we have held that 
“Section 12 [of the Securities Act] creates a new cause of 
action,” and that “the provisions of Section 13 [of the 
Securities Act] are part of and a limitation upon the right of 
action given by Section 12(2).”  Id. (citations omitted).  
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, we have never 
directly addressed whether a Securities Act plaintiff must 
plead compliance with Section 13. 
 Three courts of appeals have historically held that a 
Securities Act plaintiff must plead compliance with Section 
13.  See Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 
1991), vacated on other grounds under the name Dennler v. 
Trippet, 503 U.S. 978 (1992); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 
685 (1st Cir. 1978).  The Tenth Circuit provided no 
justification for this rule.  See Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1434.  The 
Eighth and First Circuits advanced the same rationale as the 
District Court.  See Davidson, 973 F.2d at 1402 n.8 (“[T]he 
timeliness requirement is substantive.”); see also Cook, 573 
F.2d at 695 (“[W]hen the very statute which creates the cause 
of action also contains a limitation period, the statute of 
limitations not only bars the remedy but also destroys the 
liability.” (quotation omitted)). 
 In contrast, three other courts of appeals have recently 
held that a plaintiff need not plead compliance with the 
statute of limitations in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which, as we discuss below, is similar to the statute of 
limitations in the Securities Act.  See Johnson v. Aljian, 490 
F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2007); La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 
358 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds 
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by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Tregenza 
v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1993), 
abrogated on other grounds by Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 
S. Ct. 1784 (2010).  In Tregenza, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that the Eighth, Tenth, and First Circuits relied on “the 
archaic rule that in the case of common law claims the statute 
of limitations merely limits the remedy, while in the case of 
statutory claims it limits or defines the substantive right.”  12 
F.3d at 719 (citation omitted).  But the court rejected this 
theory as “a conclusion rather than an explanation,” that was 
“especially dubious” because “the statute of limitations isn’t 
even found in the statute that creates the substantive right.”  
Id.  The court also observed that secondary sources suggested 
“that statutory claims are disfavored,” and “that because 
tolling principles do not apply to statutes of limitations 
governing statutory claims, it is efficient to permit judges to 
dispose of untimely statutory claims” at the motion to dismiss 
stage.  Id.  However, the court dismissed both of these 
reasons as “certainly false today.”  Id.  Because the old rule 
“persisted . . . by blind inertia,” and “ma[de] no sense,” the 
court concluded, albeit in dicta, that it was “time that it was 
discarded.”  Id. at 718-19. 
 In La Grasta, the Eleventh Circuit followed the 
Seventh Circuit’s recommendation in Tregenza.  358 F.3d at 
845.  And in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it 
had previously adhered to the old rule for the Securities Act’s 
statute of limitations, but the court refused to extend “such a 
disapproved pleading rule,” which had incurred “forceful” 
and “justified” criticism, to the Exchange Act’s statute of 
limitations.  490 F.3d at 781 n.13 (citations omitted).  The 
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court also recognized that the PSLRA “may require a plaintiff 
to plead certain facts with particularity, which may establish 
that the action is time-barred,” but the court nonetheless 
rejected the possibility that the PSLRA required a different 
result.  Id. 
 We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in 
Tregenza, which is consistent with our statute of limitations 
precedent.  For example, we have ruled, in a Securities Act 
suit, that “[a] statute of limitations defense is an affirmative 
one, and in order to undergird a dismissal, must appear on the 
face of the complaint.”  Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 718 (same).  We have also repeatedly 
held that because a statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense, “the burden of establishing its applicability to a 
particular claim rests with the defendant.”  Drennen v. PNC 
Bank Nat’l Assoc., 622 F.3d 275, 292 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 
1161 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 718 (“[A] 
plaintiff is not required to negate an affirmative defense in his 
complaint.” (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 
(1980)).  Indeed, requiring a plaintiff to plead compliance 
with a statute of limitations would effectively ensure that a 
timeliness issue would always appear on the face of a 
complaint, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to 
negate the applicability of the affirmative defense.  Therefore, 
we hold that a Securities Act plaintiff need not plead 
compliance with Section 13. 
 In a last-ditch argument for affirmance, UBS asserts 
that the Amended Complaint “facially shows noncompliance 
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with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly 
appears on the face of the pleading.”  Response Br. at 56 
(quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994)).  The problem, of course, 
is that the District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint 
for precisely the opposite reason – the Operating Engineers’ 
failure to plead any particularized facts related to the 
timeliness of the claims.  Nonetheless, UBS is correct that, in 
ruling on a motion to dismiss, we may consider “matters of 
public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and 
items appearing in the record of the case.”  Id. (quoting 
Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1384 n.2).  Because, as we discuss below, 
matters of public record and items appearing in the record of 
the case reveal that the claims in the Original Complaint were 
untimely, we will not reverse the District Court’s erroneous 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint. 
B. 
 The Operating Engineers next argue that the District 
Court erred in applying an inquiry notice standard and in 
determining that the claims in the Original Complaint were 
untimely.  UBS counters that the District Court correctly 
refused to adopt a discovery standard, and that, in any event, 
the claims in the Original Complaint were also untimely 
under that standard.  Although we hold that a discovery 
standard governs Section 13 of the Securities Act, we 
conclude that the claims in the Original Complaint were 
untimely. 
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1. 
 We first consider whether the District Court erred in 
applying an inquiry notice standard to determine whether the 
Securities Act claims in the Original Complaint were timely 
under Section 13 pursuant to our decision in Benak.  There, 
we held that “to the extent a securities fraud plaintiff was on 
inquiry notice of the basis for claims more than one year prior 
to bringing the action, his or her claim is subsequently time-
barred by the requisite statute of limitations.”  435 F.3d at 400 
(quotation omitted).  We explained that under the inquiry 
notice standard, statutes of limitations start to run when 
plaintiffs “discovered or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the basis for their claim[s] 
against the defendant[s].”  Id. (quotation omitted).  Whether 
reasonably diligent plaintiffs should have discovered the basis 
for their claims, in turn, depends on “whether they had 
sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to place them 
on ‘inquiry notice’ or to excite ‘storm warnings’ of culpable 
activity.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  And whether information 
is sufficient to excite storm warnings depends on “whether a 
reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have 
discovered the information and recognized it as a storm 
warning.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  Importantly, a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff is on inquiry notice when she would have 
discovered general facts about the fraudulent scheme by the 
defendant rather than specific facts about the fraud 
perpetrated on her.  Id. 
 If defendants carry their burden of establishing the 
existence of storm warnings, then “the burden shifts to the 
plaintiffs to show that they exercised reasonable due diligence 
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and yet were unable to discover their injuries.”  Id. (quotation 
omitted).  Plaintiffs on inquiry notice have “a duty to exercise 
reasonable diligence to uncover the basis for their claims.”  
Id. at 401 (quotation omitted).  If plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate the requisite diligence, then they “are held to 
have constructive notice of all facts that could have been 
learned through diligent investigation during the limitations 
period.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  Plaintiffs may not excuse 
their failure to inquire merely because “reasonable diligence 
would not have uncovered their injury.”  Id. (quotation 
omitted). 
 In applying this standard, the District Court refused to 
extend the Supreme Court’s holding in Merck that a discovery 
standard applies to the Exchange Act’s statute of limitations.  
130 S. Ct. at 1798.  The court reasoned that the discovery 
standard “applied to a securities fraud action under [the 
Exchange Act], and not to . . . claims under the Securities 
Act,” and that “while some other Circuits have adopted the 
Merck standard for [Securities Act] claims, the Third Circuit 
has yet to do so.”  App. at 19 n.5.  Merck’s impact on Benak 
is another issue of first impression for us. 
 In Merck, the Supreme Court affirmed our reversal of 
the district court’s dismissal of securities claims as untimely, 
but rejected and replaced our inquiry notice standard with a 
discovery standard.  Merck concerned the Exchange Act’s 
statute of limitations, which provides that a claim involving 
“fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention 
of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . 
may be brought not later than . . . 2 years after the discovery 
of the facts constituting the violation,” 130 S. Ct. at 1790 
 21 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1)).  Because “the word 
‘discovery’ is often used as a term of art in connection with 
the ‘discovery rule’” in statutes of limitations, the Court first 
adopted a discovery standard, holding that an Exchange Act 
claim accrues “(1) when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or 
(2) when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have 
discovered, ‘the facts constituting the violation’ – whichever 
comes first.”  Id. at 1789-90, 1793. 
 The Court next rejected the inquiry notice standard, 
which it understood to refer “to the point where the facts 
would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate 
further,” id. at 1797, as the statute of limitations trigger, even 
when “the actual plaintiff fails to undertake an investigation 
once placed on ‘inquiry notice,’” id. at 1798.  The Court 
explained that inquiry notice “is not necessarily the point at 
which the plaintiff would already have discovered . . . ‘facts 
constituting the violation.’”  Id.  at 1797.  For this reason, the 
inquiry notice standard conflicts with the text of the statute, 
which “says that the plaintiff’s claim accrues only after the 
‘discovery’ of [the facts constituting the violation],” and 
“contains no indication that the limitations period should 
occur at some earlier moment before ‘discovery,’ when a 
plaintiff would have begun investigating.”  Id.  Thus, the 
Court held that “the ‘discovery’ of facts that put a plaintiff on 
‘inquiry notice’ does not automatically begin the running of 
the limitations period.”  Id. at 1798. 
 We agree with the Operating Engineers that the 
discovery standard announced by the Supreme Court in 
Merck applies not only to the Exchange Act’s statute of 
limitations, but also to the Securities Act’s statute of 
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limitations.  Importantly, both statutes incorporate the word 
“discovery,” which the Merck Court identified as a term of art 
representing the discovery rule.  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 
1658(b)(1) (“[A] private right of action that involves a claim 
of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention 
of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . 
may be brought not later than . . . 2 years after the discovery 
of the facts constituting the violation.” (emphasis added)), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 77m (“No action shall be maintained to 
enforce any liability created under [the Securities Act] unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue 
statement or the omission, or after such discovery should 
have been made by the exercise of due diligence.” (emphasis 
added)).  Neither statute includes any language suggesting 
that the limitations period begins to run before discovery.  Cf. 
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1220 (2013) (declining to 
graft the discovery rule onto 28 U.S.C. § 2462 because “the 
most natural reading” of that statute of limitations, which 
expressly referenced “accrual” not “discovery,” was that the 
“clock begins to tick [] when a defendant’s allegedly 
fraudulent conduct occurs”). 
 Moreover, the Merck Court pointed out that the 
Exchange Act’s statute of limitations is indirectly based on 
the Securities Act’s statute of limitations.  130 S. Ct. at 1794-
96.  Indeed, the Exchange Act’s statute of limitations repeats 
the language of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, 364 (1991).  That decision, in turn, looked to the 
Securities Act’s statute of limitations, among others.  Id. at 
360 & n.7. 
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 Furthermore, both the Supreme Court and this Court 
have treated as interchangeable precedent dealing with the 
different statutes of limitations.  For example, immediately 
before rejecting the inquiry notice standard for Exchange Act 
claims, the Merck Court defined that standard by citing three 
court of appeals cases that dealt with Securities Act claims.  
See 130 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing, inter alia, Franze v. Equitable 
Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002); Great 
Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 
893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997); Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 
346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993)).  Similarly, in Benak, we first 
described and applied the inquiry notice standard to claims 
under the Securities Act, 435 F.3d at 400-03, and in Merck, 
we then adopted and applied the Benak inquiry notice 
standard to claims under the Exchange Act, 543 F.3d at 160-
72. 
 UBS attempts to distinguish Merck on the basis that 
the Exchange Act’s statute of limitations deals with “claim[s] 
of fraud,” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), and that fraud “is not a 
necessary element to establish a prima facie claim under 
Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2)” of the Securities Act, 
Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 270 (citation omitted).  
UBS’s reasoning is incorrect.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly made clear that the critical inquiry is whether the 
statutory language incorporates the discovery rule, not 
whether the underlying claim sounds in fraud.  See, e.g., 
Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1794 (explaining that “[l]egislatures have 
codified the discovery rule in various contexts” other than 
fraud (citations omitted)); Gabelli, 133 S. Ct. at 1224 
(declining to apply the discovery rule to fraud claims under 
 24 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 due, in part, to the lack 
of textual support in the general statute of limitations for civil 
penalty actions).  And, in any event, we have indicated that 
while fraud is not an essential element of Securities Act 
claims, such claims “can be, and often are, predicated on 
allegations of fraud.”  Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 270 
(citation omitted). 
 UBS also asserts that the Second Circuit has 
“concluded that Merck applies only to securities fraud claims 
arising under the Exchange Act, and not to non-fraud 
Securities Act claims.”  Response Br. at 36 (citing Koch v. 
Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2012)).  
But UBS overstates the Second Circuit’s holding.  In Koch, to 
distinguish the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) statute of limitations, the court 
stated that “[n]othing in Merck’s discussion of [28 U.S.C.] 
§ 1658(b) purports . . . to apply [the discovery standard] 
outside the context of the statute at issue in that case.”  669 
F.3d at 149.  However, the RICO statute of limitations is 
“silent on the issue” of accrual, and for this reason, the 
general discovery accrual rule applies to a RICO claim, 
whereby the “discovery of the injury, not discovery of the 
other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.”  Id. 
(quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000)).  In 
contrast, Merck “involved a statutory exception to the 
common law rule” because the Exchange Act statute of 
limitations “was not silent, but rather stated that discovery of 
the facts constituting the ‘violation’ lead to accrual.”  Id.  
Because the Securities Act statute of limitations is also 
expressly contingent on the discovery of the facts constituting 
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the violation, namely, “the discovery of the untrue statement 
or the omission,” 15 U.S.C. § 77m, Koch is distinguishable.  
Therefore, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Merck, we hold that the discovery standard governs whether 
Securities Act claims are timely under Section 13.
5
 
 Regarding the amount of information a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff must have about a particular fact before she 
is deemed to have “discovered” it under the new standard, we 
agree with the Second Circuit’s analysis in City of Pontiac 
General Employees’ Retirement System v. MBIA, Inc., 637 
F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2011).  As the MBIA court pointed 
out, the Merck Court “specifically referenced pleading 
requirements when discussing the limitations trigger.”  Id. at 
175 (citing Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796).  Also, it is logical to 
link the statute of limitations standard with the pleading 
standard; the purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent 
stale claims, but claims cannot be stale until they have 
accrued, and claims cannot accrue until they can be 
adequately pled.  Id.  Thus, we adopt the MBIA court’s 
holding that “a fact is not deemed ‘discovered’ until a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient 
information about that fact to adequately plead it in a 
complaint . . . with sufficient detail and particularity to 
survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”  Id. 
                                              
5
 Although this panel lacks the authority to overrule a 
binding precedential opinion of a prior panel, we may 
reevaluate our precedent in light of an intervening Supreme 
Court decision.  Inst. Inv. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 
276 n.50 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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 Despite our holding that the inquiry notice standard no 
longer governs the statute of limitations under Section 13 for 
Securities Act claims, we disagree with the Operating 
Engineers’ recommendation that we discard Benak and its 
progeny.  The Merck Court clearly preserved a limited role 
for the old standard, acknowledging that “terms such as 
‘inquiry notice’ and ‘storm warnings’ may be useful to the 
extent that they identify a time when the facts would have 
prompted a reasonably diligent plaintiff to begin 
investigating.”  130 S. Ct. at 1798.  This information may be 
helpful because the “limitations period puts plaintiffs who fail 
to investigate once on ‘inquiry notice’ at a disadvantage 
because it lapses [a certain time] after a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would have discovered the necessary facts,” and a 
“plaintiff who fails entirely to investigate or delays 
investigating may well not have discovered those facts by that 
time.”  Id. (citation omitted).  However, we caution that the 
inquiry notice standard can only play a supporting role 
because “the limitations period does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff . . . discovers or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would 
have discovered ‘the facts constituting the violation,’ . . . 
irrespective of whether the actual plaintiff undertook a 
reasonably diligent investigation.”  Id. 
 We also disagree with UBS’s suggestion that because 
Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims do not include a 
scienter element, there is no practical difference between the 
discovery standard and the inquiry notice standard for 
Securities Act claims.  On the one hand, the two standards 
will not automatically yield the same result for Securities Act 
claims.  See id. at 1797 (“[T]he point where the facts would 
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lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate further . . . is 
not necessarily the point at which the plaintiff would already 
have discovered facts showing scienter or other ‘facts 
constituting the violation.’” (emphasis added)).  On the other 
hand, the difference between the two standards will normally 
fluctuate in tandem with the level of specificity of the 
information about a fact that is available to a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff.  See id. at 1798 (“[A] reasonably diligent 
investigation . . . may consume as little as a few days or as 
much as a few years.” (quotation omitted)); MBIA, 637 F.3d 
at 175 (“[T]he amount of particularity and detail a plaintiff 
must know before having ‘discovered’ the fact will depend on 
the nature of the fact.”).  Thus, if the information is 
generalized, – i.e., does not refer to a specific security or 
defendant – then there will typically be a larger temporal 
disparity between the start of the investigation and the 
discovery of the facts constituting the violation.  But if the 
information is particularized, – i.e., does refers to a specific 
security or defendant – then there will usually be a smaller 
temporal disparity between the start of the investigation and 
the discovery of the facts constituting the violation. 
2. 
 We next decide whether the District Court erred in 
determining that the claims in the Original Complaint were 
untimely.  The court rejected the Operating Engineers’ 
argument that general storm warnings referencing 
Countrywide and IndyMac “were not specific enough to place 
[a reasonably diligent plaintiff] on inquiry notice” because 
they did not reference UBS, the Certificates, or the Offering 
Documents.  App. at 22.  Instead, in light of the “sheer 
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volume of reports, articles, and lawsuits concerning the 
mortgage lending industry and [mortgage-backed securities] 
available prior to February of 2009,” the court opined that “a 
reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would not need to 
know the details of the specific loans that comprised their 
certificates in order to trigger an investigation.”6  Id. at 24. 
 On appeal, the Operating Engineers admit that there 
were storm warnings about Countrywide and IndyMac more 
than a year before the Original Complaint was filed, Reply 
                                              
6
 The District Court also determined that, even if it 
were true that a reasonably diligent plaintiff “could not have 
discovered the facts underlying [her] claims until after 
February 20, 2009, when the ratings agencies Moody’s and 
S&P downgraded the . . . Certificates,” App. at 22, the 
Operating Engineers had not demonstrated reasonable 
diligence because they admitted “that [they] did not learn of 
significant losses to the value of [their] Certificates until 
March 29, 2010, over a year after the Certificates’ ratings 
were downgraded,” id. at 24 (citing id. at 464 ¶ 193).  Under 
the discovery standard, the statute of limitations “begins to 
run once the plaintiff did discover or a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would have ‘discovered the facts constituting the 
violation’ – whichever comes first.”  Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 
1798 (emphasis added).  Because we conclude, as discussed 
below, that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have 
discovered the untrue statements or the omissions more than a 
year before the Original Complaint was filed, the fact that the 
Operating Engineers did not discover their claims until more 
than a year following the Moody’s downgrade is irrelevant. 
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Br. at 19 (“Beginning as early as August 2006, numerous 
lawsuits, governmental investigations, and press reports 
revealed significant misconduct at numerous mortgage loan 
originators, such as Countrywide and IndyMac, concerning 
various mortgage loan underwriting practices.”),7 and that the 
Offering Documents indicated that Countrywide and 
IndyMac collectively originated about 92% of the loans 
underlying the Certificates, App. at 1596.  But based on 
Merck and MBIA, the Operating Engineers argue that because 
a reasonably diligent plaintiff does not discover a fact 
constituting a violation until she can state a plausible claim 
about her particular security, the storm warnings must be 
certificate-specific.  We disagree. 
                                              
7
 In determining that the claims in the Original 
Complaint were untimely, the District Court relied, in part, on 
an “August 2006 class action suit against IndyMac . . . [that] 
alleged [a] ‘systematic and continued failure to provide 
independent and effective appraisals and evaluations,’ which 
caused damage to [mortgage-backed securities] holders.”  
App. at 21 (citation omitted).  The District Court’s 
consideration of storm warnings that pre-dated the Operating 
Engineers’ purchase of the Certificates on September 18, 
2007 was error.  See MBIA, 637 F.3d at 176 (“[I]f the statute 
of limitations cannot begin to run until a claim has accrued, 
and a securities fraud claim does not accrue until the plaintiff 
has bought or sold the relevant security, then the statute of 
limitations cannot begin to run until after the plaintiff’s 
transaction.”). 
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 As discussed above, the Merck Court preserved a 
limited role for inquiry notice in a statute of limitations 
analysis.  130 S. Ct. at 1797-98.  Thus, we look to our pre-
Merck precedent, which instructs that a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff would undertake an investigation based on “[t]he 
filing of related lawsuits,” “news articles and analyst’s 
reports,” and “prospectuses, quarterly reports, and other 
information related to their investments,” Benak, 435 F.3d at 
400, 403 n.20 (quotations omitted), even when the 
information therein is not “company-specific” or security-
specific, DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217.  Nonetheless, the 
Merck Court ultimately rejected the inquiry notice standard as 
the trigger for the statute of limitations.  130 S. Ct. at 1797-
98.  Thus, while a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have 
started an investigation based on these non-security-specific 
storm warnings, the statute of limitations would not have 
begun to run until she discovered the untrue statements or the 
omissions concerning her particular Certificates. 
 The Operating Engineers next contend that a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would not have discovered the 
untrue statements or the omissions regarding the Certificates 
until the rating downgrade by Moody’s on February 20, 2009 
because UBS made two reassuring, specific statements about 
the Certificates that dissipated the general storm warnings 
about Countrywide and IndyMac.  First, on September 18, 
2007, when the Operating Engineers purchased the 
Certificates, the Offering Documents reassured that there 
were “no material legal proceedings currently pending against 
any of [UBS Real Estate], [MASTR] or the [MASTR Trust].”  
App. at 1728.  Second, on March 31, 2008, MASTR filed a 
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public SEC Form 10-K reassuring that MASTR “kn[ew] of 
no material pending legal proceedings involving 
[Countrywide or IndyMac], other than routine litigation 
incidental to the duties” of those companies.”8  Reply Br. at 
18 (quotation omitted). 
 We have recognized that “reassurances can dissipate 
apparent storm warnings if an investor of ordinary 
intelligence would reasonably rely on them to allay the 
investor’s concerns.”  Merck, 543 F.3d at 168 n.14.  Here, we 
agree that, despite widely-publicized reports about 
widespread problems with underwriting standards at 
Countrywide and Indy-Mac, an investor of ordinary 
intelligence would reasonably rely on UBS’s reassurances 
that the particular loans underlying its specific Certificates 
were not afflicted with the common ailment.  Thus, as of 
                                              
8
 UBS argues that we should not take judicial notice of 
the Form 10-K, which the Operating Engineers failed to 
produce before the District Court or in their Opening Brief.  
In Oran v. Stafford, we took judicial notice of a public SEC 
filing, which had not been presented to the district court, but 
which had been referenced in the opening brief, concluding 
that there was “no risk of unfair prejudice or surprise.”  226 
F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  Here, while 
the Operating Engineers waited to reference the document 
until their Reply Brief, we conclude that there is no danger of 
unfair prejudice or surprise since we have carefully 
considered UBS’s eight-page motion addressing the 
document, and since UBS itself filed the document with the 
SEC.  Thus, we will take judicial notice of the Form 10-K. 
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March 31, 2008, a reasonably diligent plaintiff would not 
have inquired about potential claims related to the 
Certificates. 
 However, we conclude that by September 9, 2008, a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have begun investigating 
his Certificates.  The record reflects that on that date, a class 
of plaintiffs – including the Operating Engineers – filed an 
amended class action complaint in the California Superior 
Court against both Countrywide and UBS Securities, 
asserting claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the 
Securities Act that were substantially similar to those in this 
case.  That complaint specifically alleged that Countrywide 
was the “originator of the majority of the underlying 
mortgages supporting the securitization transactions,” and 
that UBS Securities “drafted and disseminated the offering 
documents for the Certificates,” and “issued false and 
misleading Prospectuses in connection therewith.”  App. at 
1296 ¶ 19, 1298-99 ¶ 29.  In particular, the “Prospectus 
Supplements” were “false and misleading” because they 
contained “omissions and misrepresentations” related to “the 
underwriting process for the mortgages,” including 
“creditworthiness of borrowers, debt-to-income levels and 
loan-to-value ratios.”  Id. at 1320 ¶ 59. 
 A reasonably diligent plaintiff who had purchased 
mortgage-backed securities from UBS Securities based on 
loans that were largely originated by Countrywide would 
have noticed that complaint.  Benak, 435 F.3d at 403 n.20.  
The allegations in the complaint, which suggest that UBS 
Securities could not be trusted to verify Countrywide’s 
underwriting standards for the loans underlying the securities 
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it sold, would have undermined UBS’s prior reassurances 
about the Certificates.  Thus, a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
would have begun to inquire about her Certificates by 
September 9, 2008. 
 Because UBS has established the existence of storm 
warnings, we must evaluate whether a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff who began investigating in September 2008 would 
have discovered the untrue statements or the omissions about 
the Certificates in the Offering Documents before February 
2009.  The Operating Engineers claim that no reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts underlying 
their claims because “[t]he mortgage loan files for the 
borrowers whose mortgage loans were included in the 
mortgage pools underlying the Certificates have never been 
available to investors.”  App. at 461 ¶ 187.  The Operating 
Engineers admit that UBS made available certain loan-level 
data about the underlying mortgages in March 2007 and June 
2008.  Id. at 461 ¶ 188.  But the Operating Engineers allege 
that the information was inadequate to enable them to 
discover their claims because it did not include “specific 
borrower’s names and addresses,” and so did not allow them 
to “determine whether the loans satisfied the represented loan 
criteria, including such important and material data points as 
[loan-to-value] and [debt-to-income ratios].”  Id. at 462 ¶ 189. 
 According to the Operating Engineers, they acted as a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff  with respect to the Certificates at 
all times.  Id. at 463-64 ¶ 192.  In particular, the Operating 
Engineers aver that they retained a consultant to investigate 
their potential claims after they were appointed Lead Plaintiff 
on October 19, 2010.  Id. at 464 ¶ 194.  The consultant “used 
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a proprietary process” that involved “combing through court 
filings and numerous databases” in order to “uncover 
financial information for certain of the individual borrowers 
of the loans underlying the Certificates in order to back test 
the accuracy of the [debt-to-income], occupancy and [loan-to-
value] ratios disclosed by [UBS].”  Id.  Based on this 
investigation, the consultant constructed the substantive 
allegations in the Amended Complaint,
9
 which was filed on 
December 13, 2010.  Id.  In other words, by the Operating 
Engineers’ own timeline, their reasonably diligent 
investigation took about two months to uncover the facts 
underlying their claims in 2010. 
 The question then becomes whether a comparable 
investigation would have been equally successful in 
September 2008.  The Operating Engineers respond in the 
negative because the consultant could not have “solely [used] 
the limited loan-level data” made available by UBS in March 
2007 and June 2008.  Id. at 464-65 ¶ 195.  We conclude that a 
                                              
9
 The Operating Engineers actually alleged, in the 
Second Amended Complaint, that their consultant’s 
investigation “resulted in the substantive allegations set forth 
[t]herein.”  App. at 464 ¶ 194.  However, this admission also 
applies to the Amended Complaint.  As the District Court 
explained, the difference between the Second Amended 
Complaint and the Amended Complaint is that the former 
added ten paragraphs about the statute of limitations (not 
about the underlying substantive allegations) to the latter.  Id. 
at 15.  Thus, the consultant’s investigation resulted in the 
substantive allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint. 
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reasonably diligent plaintiff’s investigation would have been 
no less fruitful in 2008 than in 2010. 
 Although the Operating Engineers do not elaborate, 
the consultant’s “proprietary process” apparently involved an 
analysis of “court filings.”  Id. at 464 ¶ 194.  Rather than the 
court filings – such as the complaint filed in California 
Superior Court in September 2008 – that gave rise to the 
storm warnings, it seems as though the consultant sought out 
court filings related to bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings 
on the loans underlying the Certificates.  See id. (“This 
‘reverse-engineering’ process included combing through 
court filings . . . to uncover financial information for certain 
of the individual borrowers of the loans underlying the 
Certificates.”).  As early as June 2008, UBS disclosed that 
about 12.5% of the loans underlying the Certificates were tied 
up in either bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings.  Id. at 461 
¶ 188, 2018.  Thus, in 2008, the consultant would have known 
of these cases and would have used them to back engineer the 
actual debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios for the 
borrowers in bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings. 
 The consultant’s “proprietary process” also apparently 
involved an analysis of “numerous databases.”  Id. at 464 ¶ 
194.  If, as the Operating Engineers allege, the consultant’s 
investigation were reasonably diligent, it would have included 
a review of the SEC’s databases.  Benak, 435 F.3d at 400.  In 
March 2007, UBS publicly filed a Free Writing Prospectus 
pursuant to SEC Rule 433 that set forth granular loan-level 
details, including purported debt-to-income and loan-to-value 
ratios as well as occupancy rates for the underlying 
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mortgages.
10
  Id. at 1526-38.  Thus, in 2008, the consultant 
would have compared the actual debt-to-income and loan-to-
value ratios gleaned from bankruptcy and foreclosure 
proceedings with UBS’s represented values, thereby 
discovering the facts underlying the Operating Engineers’ 
claims. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that a reasonably 
diligent investigation would have yielded the same results in 
both 2008 and 2010.  Thus, a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
would have discovered the untrue statements or the omissions 
about the Certificates in the Offering Documents in 
November 2008, two months after she was alerted by the 
complaint filed in California Superior Court in  September 
2008 to the possibility that she might have claims.  Because a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have been able to plead 
viable Securities Act claims in November 2008, the Section 
13 statute of limitations would have run, at the latest, in 
November 2009.  Therefore, the Original Complaint, which 
was not filed until February 2010, was untimely. 
                                              
10
 It would be inappropriate to consider UBS’s March 
2007 SEC filing as a storm warning, since the Operating 
Engineers did not purchase their Certificates until September 
2007.  See MBIA, 637 F.3d at 176.  Nonetheless, it stands to 
reason that once a plaintiff is on inquiry notice, a reasonably 
diligent investigation would uncover information that pre-
dates her purchase of her securities. 
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IV. 
In sum, we hold that a Securities Act plaintiff need not 
plead compliance with Section 13, and that the timeliness of 
Securities Act claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 
should be measured against a discovery standard.  We 
conclude, however, that the claims in the Original Complaint 
were untimely.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint with 
prejudice. 
